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Abstract. Recently, several anonymization algorithms have appeared
for privacy preservation on graphs. Some of them are based on random-
ization techniques and on k-anonymity concepts. We can use both of
them to obtain an anonymized graph with a given k-anonymity value.
In this paper we compare algorithms based on both techniques in order
to obtain an anonymized graph with a desired k-anonymity value. We
want to analyze the complexity of these methods to generate anonymized
graphs and the quality of the resulting graphs.
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1 Introduction
Currently, the data mining processes require large amounts of data, which often
contain personal and private information of users and individuals. Although
basic processes are performed on data anonymization, such as removing names
or other key identiers, remaining information can still be sensitive, and useful
for an attacker to re-identify users and individuals. E.g., birthday and ZIP codes
might be enough to re-identify individuals [1]. To solve this problem, methods
that perform introduction of noise in the original data have been developed in
order to hinder the subsequent processes of re-identication.
In this paper we will discuss anonymization techniques applied to graph
formatted data. One of the most well known data that can be represented as
graphs are social networks. Social networks are very interesting for their analysis
by scientists and companies, nevertheless any release to a third party for their
analysis requires the application of a protection procedure.
There are multiple methods for privacy preservation in graphs. One of the
most used are random-based methods, which modify graphs at random to hin-
der re-identication processes. Other methods are based on the concept of k-
anonymity [1]. These methods are more complex than random-based. In this
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paper we ask ourselves if we can get the same results using a random algorithm
and a algorithm to select k-anonymous graphs.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review dierent anonymiza-
tion methods for graphs' privacy preservation. Section 3 presents our experimen-
tal framework, including anonymization algorithms, graph and re-identication
risk assessment and data sets used in our experiments. In Section 4, we show the
experiments and discuss the results. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss conclusions
and future work.
2 State of the Art
Anonymization methods depend on the type of data they are intended to work
with. In this paper, we will work with simple, undirected and unlabelled graphs.
Because these graphs have no attributes or labels in the edges, information is
only in the structure of the graph itself and, due to this, the adversary can use
information about the structure of the network to attack the privacy. However,
since all of the information is contained in it, we want to preserve the structure
of the graph.
2.1 Random-based Methods
One widely adopted strategy of graph modication approaches are randomiza-
tion methods. Randomization methods are based on adding random noise in
original data. There are two basic approaches to work with graph data: (1)
Rand Add/Del : randomly add and delete the same number of edges from the
original graph (this strategy keeps the number of edges) and (2) Rand Switch:
exchange edges between pairs of nodes (this strategy keeps the number of edges
and the degree of all nodes).
Hay et al. [2] proposed a method to anonymize unlabelled graphs. This
method is called Random Perturbation and is based on two phases: rst, m
edges are randomly removed from the graph and then false m edges are ran-
domly added. The set of vertices is not changed and the number of edges is
preserved in the anonymized graph.
Ying et al. [3] proposed a variation of Rand Add/Del method, called Rand
Add/Del-B. This method implements modications (by adding and removing
edges) on the nodes at high risk of re-identication, not at random over the
entire set of nodes. The authors expect to introduce fewer perturbations (with
better utility preservation) to achieve the same privacy protection.
2.2 k-Anonymity-based Methods
Another strategy widely adopted for privacy-preserving is based on the concept
of k-anonymity. This concept was introduced by Sweeney [1] for the privacy
preservation on relational data. Formally, the k-anonymity model is dened as:
let RT (A1; : : : ; An) be a table and QIRT be the quasi-identier associated with
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it. RT is said to satisfy k-anonymity if and only if each sequence of values in
RT [QIRT ] appears with at least k occurrences in RT [QIRT ]. The k-anonymity
model indicates that an attacker can not distinguish between dierent k records
although he manages to nd a group of quasi-identiers. Therefore, the attacker
can not re-identify an individual with a probability greater than 1k .
Dierent concepts can be used to apply the k-anonymity model on graphs.
A widely option is to use the node degree as a quasi-identier [4]. It is called k-
degree anonymity. We assume that the attacker knows the degree of some nodes.
If the attacker identies a single node with the same degree in the anonymized
graph, then he has re-identied this node. K-anonymity methods are based on
modifying the graph structure (by adding and removing edges) to ensure that
all nodes satisfy the k-anonymity properties for the degrees of all the nodes. In
other words, the main objective is that all nodes have at least k  1 other nodes
sharing the same degree.
2.3 Graph Assessment
Several measures and metrics have been used to quantify network structure in
graph formatted data. Usually, the authors compare the values obtained by the
original data and the anonymized data in order to quantify the noise introduced
by the anonymization process.
Hay et al. [2] proposed ve structural properties from graph theory for quan-
tifying network structures. For each node, the authors evaluate closeness cen-
trality (average shortest path from the node to every other node), betweenness
centrality (proportion of all shortest paths through the node) and path length
distribution (computed from the shortest path between each pair of nodes). For
the graph as a whole, they evaluate the degree distribution and the diameter
(the maximum shortest path between any two nodes). The objective is to keep
these ve steps closer to their original values, assuming that it involves little
distortion in the anonymized data.
Zou et al. [6] dened a simple method for evaluating information loss on
undirected and unlabelled graphs. The method is based on the dierence between
the original and the anonymized graph edges. Formally, Cost(G; eG) = (E[ eE) 
(E \ eE) where G(V;E) is the original graph, V is the node set, E is the edge
set, and eG(eV ; eE) is the anonymized graph.
2.4 Risk Assessment
Re-identication risk in anonymized graph is important to evaluate the quality
of any anonymization process. Determining the knowledge of the adversary is
the main problem. From the knowledge of the adversary, dierent methods for
assessing the re-identication risk have been developed.
Zhou et al. [13] model the background knowledge of adversaries in various
ways: Identifying attributes of nodes, nodes degrees, link relationship, neigh-
bourhoods, embedded sub-graphs and graph metrics. We focus on a knowledge
of the adversary based on degree nodes.
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Hay et al. [2] [5] proposed a method, called Vertex Renement Queries, to
model the knowledge of the adversary. This class of queries, with increasing
attack power, models the local neighbourhood structure of a node in the network.
The weakest knowledge query, H0(vj), simply returns the label of the node vj .
The queries are successively more descriptive: H1(vj) returns the degree of vj ,
H2(vj) returns the list of each neighbours' degree, and so on. The queries can
be dened iteratively, where Hi(vj) returns the multi-set of values which are the
result of evaluating Hi 1 on the set of nodes adjacent to vj :
Hi(vj) = fHi 1(v1);Hi 1(v2); : : : ;Hi 1(vm)g (1)
where v1; v2; : : : ; vm are the nodes adjacent to vj .
A candidate set for a query Hi is a set of all nodes with the same value
of Hi. Therefore, the cardinality of a candidate set for Hi is the number of
indistinguishable nodes inG underHi. Note that if the cardinality of the smallest
candidate set under H1 is k, the probability of re-identication is 1k . Hence, the
k-degree anonymity value for G is k.
3 Experimental Set Up
Our main objective is to compare random-based and k-anonymity-based algo-
rithms for privacy preservation on graphs. If we want to anonymize a graph
to a specic value of k-anonymity, then we should ask ourselves, what kind of
method is the best to achieve this purpose. I.e., we want to compare random-
based and k-anonymity-based methods to anonymize graphs to a specic value
of k-anonymity.
Random-based methods modify the structure of the graph, so they can mod-
ify the value of k-degree anonymity. But we can not specically control the
desired value. Therefore, if we want to get an anonymized graph with a specic
value of k-anonymity, we must generate multiple anonymized graphs until we
nd one with the desired k-anonymity value.
Fig. 1: Experimental framework.
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To conduct this experiment, we choose three graph formatted datasets, two
anonymization algorithms and several quality measures. Figure 1 shows our ex-
perimental framework. First, we anonymize the graphs data sets (details are
shown in Section 3.1) using two anonymization algorithms (Section 3.2). Then,
we evaluate original and anonymized data using measures for quantifying net-
work structures (Section 3.3). And nally, we use risk assessment measures (Sec-
tion 3.4) to assess the improvement in privacy-preserving on anonymized data.
3.1 Data Sets
Three dierent data sets are used in our experiments. Table 1 shows a summary
of the data sets' main features. The data sets considered are the following ones:
{ Zachary's Karate Club [7] is a graph widely used in the literature. The graph
shows the relationships among 34 members of a karate club.
{ American College Football [8] is a graph of American football games between
Division IA colleges during regular season Fall 2000.
{ Jazz Musicians [9] is a graph of jazz musicians and their relationships.
Table 1: Data sets properties.
Data set Nodes Edges Average degree Average distance Diameter
Zachary's Karate Club 34 78 4.588 2.408 5
American College Football 115 613 10.661 2.508 4
Jazz Musicians 198 2,742 27.697 2.235 6
3.2 Anonymization Methods
We choose the following random-based and k-anonymity-based anonymization
algorithms for our experiments.
Random-based Algorithm
Among all existing random-based anonymization algorithms, we use Random
Perturbation (RP) [2]. This algorithm removes and adds the same number of
edges from the original graph, by keeping the total number of edges in the graph.
As Figure 1 describes, we perform multiple anonymizations using RP algo-
rithm. The total number of anonymized graphs depends on each data set and
will be specied in each experiment. For each k-anonymity value we want to
achieve, we execute the RP algorithm iteratively, until we get a graph with the
k-anonymity value. The process starts with an anonymization percentage of 1%.
If a graph with the desired k-anonymity value is generated, it is the solution
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and anonymization process nishes. After 100 iterations, and if a graph with
the desired k-anonymity value is not found, the anonymization percentage is
increased at 1%. This process is repeated until the anonymization percentage
reaches a limit of 50%, when the process stops without a solution. Therefore,
5,000 randomly anonymized graphs are generated before RP nishes without
solution.
k-Anonymity-based Algorithm
We use the Genetic Graph Anonymization (GGA) [10] for obtaining an
anonymized graph which preserves k-anonymity on the degree. The approach,
based on genetic algorithms, can be described in terms of the following two steps.
1. Given the degree sequence of the nodes of G(V;E), d = fd1;    ; dng, we
construct a new sequence ed that is k-degree anonymous and minimizes the
distance between the two sequences.
2. We construct a new graph eG(eV ; eE) with degree sequence ed in which eV = V
and eE \ E  E.
Our proposal for the rst step of the anonymization algorithm uses genetic
algorithms. These algorithms use the mutation process and the tness function
dened as follows.
Mutation process. Add one to an element of the degree sequence and subtract
one from another element. This transaction represents a change in one of the
nodes of an edge. For example, if we modify node v1 to v2 on the edge e0;1 =
(v0; v1) we get the edge e0;2 = (v0; v2). This node change is represented in the
degree sequence as subtracting one to the degree value of node v1 and adding
one to the degree value of node v2. Note that our genetic algorithm does not
use the recombination of pairs of parents, since this process systematically
breach the rule that preserves the number of edges in the graph, and therefore
generate no valid candidates.
Fitness function. The tness function, which evaluates candidates, is com-
puted from three parameters: (1) the current k-anonymity value, where the
objective is to achieve a k-anonymity value greater than or equal to the de-
sired value. (2) The distance between the anonymized and the original degree
sequence, computed by Equation 2, where the objective is to minimize this
value. And (3), the number of nodes that do not meet the desired value of
k-anonymity, which will decrease until it reaches 0, when we get the desired
k-anonymity value.
D(d; ed) = nX
i=0
j edi   di j (2)
where n =j V j.
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In the second step we make the necessary changes in the original graph to
obtain the anonymized graph. The changes that have occurred in the degree
sequence indicate the nodes that should change its degree. I.e., indicate the
edges to be modied.
3.3 Graph Assessment
We use dierent measures for quantifying network structure. These measures
and metrics are used to compare both the original and the anonymized data in
order to quantify the level of perturbation introduced in the anonymized data
by the anonymization process. These measures and metrics evaluate some key
graph properties.
In the rest of this section we review the measures used. In the denitions we
use G(V;E) and eG(V; eE) to indicate the original and the anonymized graphs,
n =j V j to denote the number of nodes, and dij to denote the length of the
shortest geodesic path from node vi to vj .
The rst one is average distance. It is dened as the average of the distances
between each pair of nodes in the graph. It measures the minimum average
number of edges between any pair of nodes. Formally, it is dened as:
AD(G) =
P
i;j dij 
n
2
 (3)
The second is edge intersection. It is dened as the intersection of the
edges set. Formally:
EI(G; eG) = E \ eEj E [ eE j (4)
The third is betweenness centrality, which measures the fraction of the
number of shortest paths that go through each vertex. This measure indicates
the centrality of a node based on the ow between other nodes in the graph. A
node with a high value indicates that this node is part of many shortest paths
in the graph, which will be a key node in the graph structure. This measure is
normalized to be in the range [0,1]. Formally, we dene the betweenness centrality
of a node vi as:
BC(vi) =
1
n2
X
st
gist
gst
(5)
where gist is the number of geodesic paths from s to t that pass through vi, and
gst is the total number of geodesic paths from s to t.
The fourth one is closeness centrality, which is dened as the inverse of
the average distance to all accessible nodes. It is normalized in the range [0, 1].
Closeness is an inverse measure of centrality in that a larger value indicates a
less central node while a smaller value indicates a more central node. Formally,
we dene the closeness centrality of a node vi as:
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CC(vi) =
nP
j dij
(6)
The betweenness and closeness centrality lead to dierent results for the
same graph as they focus on dierent aspects of centrality. As shown above,
both compute a value for each node. To compare the original and the protected
graph, it is convenient to aggregate these values in a single one. For each of
the two measures, we compute an average dierence using the root mean square
(other average functions [11] could be used here as well) as follows:
Diff(G; G^) =
r
1
n
((g1   g^1)2 + : : :+ (gn   g^n)2) (7)
where gi is either the betweenness centrality or the closeness centrality of node
vi.
The number of nodes, edges and average degree are not considered to assess
the anonymization process because the methods analysed in this work keep these
values constant.
3.4 Risk Assessment
As we have discussed above, it is necessary to dene the adversary's knowledge to
dene a method for assessing the re-identication risk. In this paper we assume
a knowledge of the adversary based on the degree of the nodes and we use Vertex
Renement Queries of level 1 (H1) as a re-identication risk measures.
The H1(vi) indicates the degree of node vi and the candidate set of H1,
candHi , is the set of all nodes grouped by their degree. That is, one subset
corresponds to all nodes of degree value equal to 1, another to all nodes of
degree value equal to 2, and so on. Therefore, the minimum cardinality of the
subsets corresponds to the value of k-degree anonymity. But candHi also shows
interesting information about how re-identication risk is distributed on all nodes
of the graph.
candH1 = fvj 2 V j H1(vi) = H1(vj)g (8)
In our experiments we analyse how the candidate set evolves, so this allows
us to see how the graph evolves in terms of re-identication's risk.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, we show the results of our experiments. We compare RP and
GGA algorithms to anonymize a graph with a specic k-anonymity value.
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4.1 Zachary's Karate Club
The original graph has a k-anonymity value equal to 1. RP algorithm achieves
anonymized graphs with a k-anonymity values equal 2,3 and 4, while GGA
achieves graphs with a k-anonymity values equal to 2, 4 and 5. So, GGA algo-
rithm gets a higher k-anonymity value than RP algorithm. Table 2 shows that
RP algorithm is much faster than GGA algorithm.
Table 2: Zachary's Karate Club generation time.
Algorithm k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5
RP 00:01 sec 00:06 sec 00:53 sec -
GGA 00:33 sec - 01:38 sec 02:34 sec
Average distance is shown in Figure 2a. GGA algorithm achieves better re-
sults than RP algorithm for all values of k. Note that the k = 1 values correspond
to the original graph. Figure 2b shows edge intersection between original and
anonymized graphs. Also, GGA algorithm achieves better results for all values
of k. In addition, RP algorithm obtains a very bad result for k=4, where edge
intersection measure falls to 20%.
The RMS error of the betweenness centrality, Figure 2c, and the RMS error
of the closeness centrality, Figure 2d, show similar results on both measures,
where GGA introduces less perturbation than RP.
Figures 2e and 2f show the details of the candH1 results for RP and GGA
algorithms. Nodes with a candidate set of size 1 have been uniquely re-identied
(6 nodes, 17.64%, on the original graph). Nodes with a candidate set of size
between 2 and 4 are in high risk of re-identication (5 nodes, 14.70%, on the
original graph). However, nodes with candidates set between 5 and 10 and greater
than 10 are well-protected (23 nodes, 67.64%, on the original graph).
If we compare the results of anonymized graphs with a value of k=2, we
can see that the GGA algorithm achieves a smaller set of nodes at high risk of
re-identication (41.17% RP and 35.29% GGA). If we compare the results with
a value of k=4, we can see that the GGA algorithm achieves a smaller set of
nodes at high risk of re-identication and a bigger set of well-protected nodes.
4.2 American College Football
The original graph has a k-anonymity value equal to 1. RP algorithm get values of
k-anonymity of 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, and GGA algorithm get values of k-anonymity of
4 and 10. Table 3 shows generation time for both algorithms. Like in the previous
experiment, RP algorithm is faster than GGA algorithm, but GGA algorithm
achieves higher values of k-anonymity than RP algorithm.
In Figure 3a we can see that GGA algorithm gets much better results on
average distance than RP algorithm, especially for k-anonymity values greater
than 5. Figure 2b shows the same behaviour for edge intersection.
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(a) Average distance (b) Edge intersection
(c) RMS error of betweenness centrality (d) RMS error of closeness centrality
(e) candH1 evolution for RP algorithm (f) candH1 evolution for GGA algorithm
Fig. 2: Zachary's Karate Club
Table 3: American College Football generation time.
Algorithm k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 k=7 k=8 k=9 k=10
RP 00:01 sec 00:01 sec 00:04 sec 00:06 sec 01:21 sec - - - -
GGA - - 00:51 sec - - - - - 02:01 sec
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(a) Average distance (b) Edge intersection
(c) RMS error of betweenness centrality (d) RMS error of closeness centrality
(e) candH1 evolution for RP algorithm (f) candH1 evolution for GGA algorithm
Fig. 3: American College Football
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The RMS error of the betweenness centrality, Figure 3c, and the RMS error
of the closeness centrality, Figure 3d, show that GGA algorithm introduces less
perturbation in both measures.
Figures 3e and 3f show the details of the candH1 results for RP and GGA.
GGA algorithm achieves excellent results at all the range of anonymization. RP
algorithm achieves good results too, but fall short of those achieved by GGA.
4.3 Jazz Musicians
The original graph has a k-anonymity value equal to 1. Both algorithms only
achieve graphs with a k-anonymity value equal to 2. Table 4 shows generation
time for these processes.
Table 4: Jazz Musicians generation time.
Algorithm k=2
RP 3:14:27 sec
GGA 5:26:51 sec
Using this data set, average distance decreases smoothly on GGA, like in
previous data sets. Edge intersection gets a value of 99.53% on GGA k = 2
anonymized graph, while RP gets a value of 33.04% for a graph with the same
k-anonymity value. This value indicates that RP aects the quality and the use-
fulness of the anonymized data. The RMS error of the betweenness centrality
and the RMS error of the closeness centrality show that GGA algorithm intro-
duces less perturbation in both measures. The details of the candH1 results for
RP and GGA algorithms sows that RP algorithm increases the well-protected
nodes until a value of 52%, while GGA algorithm maintains the data very similar
to the initial values.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have reported an experimental study of two anonymization algo-
rithms. One of them is random-based, while the other is based on k-anonymity
model. We have applied these anonymization algorithms on three real world
social networks that have well-documented structures: Zachary's Karate Club
network, American College Football teams' network and Jazz Musicians' net-
work.
After seeing the results of the experiments, we can clearly see that k-anonymity-
based algorithm gets the best results on all data sets. This algorithm, called
GeneticGraphAnonymization (GGA), achieves a greater degree of anonymity
and produces less perturbation on graphs. So, it produces a more useful data
and a more protected data. However, GGA algorithm is slower than RP on all
data sets.
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Many interesting directions for future research have been uncovered by this
work. Other graph anonymization methods should be evaluated and compared
with our k-anonymity-based algorithm. Also, another interesting area is to eval-
uate dierent measures for the re-identication risk. There are several measures
and it is interesting to compare all of them. Finally, another graph types will be
considered, such as weighted [12] or directed graphs.
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